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In order to study the costs/benefits of a monetary' union between Germany and 
France, we attempt to go beyond a mere focus on asymmetries and examine 
what each country would have lost or gained had there been a common 
monetary policy. We try to identify the macro effects of such a change within a 
structural VAR model, which is first estimated by employing mixed long-run and 
short-run identification schemes and subsequently simulated under the 
restrictions of a common monetary policy. Our analysis centers on the effect of 
identical monetary policy on movements in output, inflation and the current 
account. We also study the effects on interest rate differentials in order to draw 
possible inferences about monetary integration. Based on the usual 
interpretations of national preferences in both countries, the results imply that, if 
anything, Germany would lose from any French participation in the setting of 
domestic monetary policy. By contrast, however, France would clearly gain from 
corresponding German participation in French decision-making.
JEL classification: F02, F15, F40
Keywords: optimum currency areas, structural vector autoregression, shocks, 
costs/benefits, monetary union
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Would European countries gain from moving to a monetary union? Efforts to 
answer this question have mostly centred on the shocks affecting the member 
countries. Except for attempts to apply large-scale macroeconomic models, this 
research has primarily tried to distinguish between common and idiosyncratic or 
symmetric and asymmetric shocks. The general idea has been that only the 
idiosyncratic or asymmetric shocks imply any costs of monetary union. Thus. 
Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) and Weber (1990) divided up movements in key 
macroeconomic variables in the EC into cross-country sums and differences, and 
used the differences to reflect the effects of the idiosyncratic shocks. Related 
work at the industry level has been done by the Commission of the European 
Economies (1990), Bini-Smaghi and Vori (1993), and Helg, Manasse, Monacelli 
and Rovelli (1994), among others. Recently, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) 
took a different approach: they used the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) 
model that was pioneered by Blanchard and Quah (1989) to derive the demand 
and supply shock components of output and prices in each country, and then 
they assessed the importance of asymmetries by looking at the association of 
these two separate structural shocks between the countries.
These efforts all leave open the fundamental question what the countries 
can do about their idiosyncratic shocks right now through independent monetary 
policy. If monetary policy feeds directly into money wages and prices, then this 
policy cannot affect real variables, and no matter how large idiosyncratic shocks 
may be, sacrificing monetary independence cannot cost much in terms of 
stabilization. The theory of the optimum currency area has always considered 
the ability to stabilize the economy through exchange rate manipulation to 
depend on the degree of price flexibility. As early as 1963, McKinnnon 
underlined the possible futility of attempts to use monetary policy to smooth the 
responses to any kinds of shocks in the case of very small and very open 
economies.
In order to address the previous issue, we examine how a country would 
have fared if its monetary policy had been dictated partly or wholly by another 
country's preferences and experience. First we analyze the actual history of 
France and Germany with the SVAR approach. Then we compare the events in 
both countries with a hypothetical scenario in which one country sets joint 
monetary policy for the two of them, or they both choose the policy together. 
The pertinence of the exercise would seem clear. If differences between shocks 
and responses to shocks in France and Germany imply high welfare costs of 
pursuing an identical monetary policy, this should show up when'we allow either 



























































































The meaning of an identical monetary policy in both countries must be 
precisely defined. By such a policy, we shall mean identical money supply 
shocks and not necessarily identical interest rates. Of course, identical interest 
rates would exist in a monetary union. But had the French authorities simply 
followed German interest rates in the seventies and eighties, their action would 
have meant lower interest rates at home and fundamentally easier monetary 
policy. Moreover, this action might have generated instability of the franc/mark 
exchange rate and thereby violated another implication of monetary' integration. 
In a monetary union, market arbitrage assures a single nominal interest rate and 
there is no internal nominal exchange rate to fix. Therefore, the monetary 
authorities can pursue any policy they like without any concern about internal 
differences in nominal interest rates on homogenous debt. That is why the most 
relevant exercise in dealing with historical series, in our view, is one where the 
authorities of France and Germany simply pursue an identical monetary policy 
without any regard for their relative interest rates. We shall interpret such 
identical policy in our counterfactual simulations of the past to mean identical 
monetary surprises in both countries.
Whether uniform monetary policies would also have promoted 
convergence of nominal interest rates is a separate issue. This other issue 
concerns the important question whether a common monetary policy would have 
tended toward monetary integration. The answer, we shall find, is positive, but 
the strength of the tendency toward monetary integration depends largely on the 
common policy which is pursued, or, in our particular examples, whether France 
or Germany was the one to decide joint policy.
The paper moves along as follows. Section 2 provides a short sketch of 
our model — an open economy version of IS-LM with a Phillips curve. In section 
3 we lay out our empirical methodology. The section proceeds, step by step, to 
explain the general identification problem at hand, our particular choice of 
specification of a SVAR, and our identifying restrictions. Because of our 
research strategy, we need to identify more shocks than. Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen did. While two shocks sufficed them, we shall require six, including 
a shock in either country stemming from the other's monetary policy. Our 
econometric work actually has much more in common with Galfs (1992) 
extension of Blanchard and Quah than Bayoumi and Eichengreen's. Like Gall, 
we use a combination of long-run and short-run restrictions, and again like him, 
we consider the long-run ones to be based on neutrality and the dominance of 
supply-side effects on potential output, while the short-run ones depend on the 
need for a lapse of at least one quarter before monetary-policy surprises bear any 





























































































Section 4 prepares the way for the main part of the analysis by discussing 
the results for Germany and France over the study period and relating them to 
our theoretical model as well as previous work. The section shows that our 
estimates agree largely with those of Gall for the United States. Important 
differences arise, nevertheless, because of the major role of two of the open- 
economy variables in our study — the real exchange rate and the relative demand 
for domestic as opposed to foreign goods.
Section 4 has the additional, important purpose of exploring Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen's criterion of asymmetry between countries. We show that by 
focusing upon cross-country correlations between structural shocks, their 
criterion tends to exaggerate the impression of differences between countries. By 
the very nature of the SVAR method of identifying shocks, the greater the 
number of structural shocks, the less likely any major cross-country correlation 
between them. In our work with six shocks, the six-by-six matrix of correlations 
of shocks between Germany and France contains only low figures J  Yet there 
exists a substantial resemblance between the French and the German 
macroeconomic experiences of the eighties. This resemblance can be made 
somewhat more apparent in the analysis by examining the cross-country 
correlations between the components of output, inflation, and the current 
account — or the primary macroeconomic variables -  that are attributable to the 
separate shocks rather than the correlations between the shocks themselves. The 
matrices of these cross-country correlations of the shock components of 
macroeconomic variables typically display larger numbers.~ Thereby the 
evidence of some degree of common experience and interdependence between 
the two countries comes back into view.
Section 5 contains our central results about monetary union. The estimates 
agree with the standard opinion that French decision-making would have created 
more unstable monetary policy in Germany during the study period, while 
German decision-making would have caused tighter monetary policy in France. 
The estimates go on to say that with France at the monetary controls, Germany 
would have experienced higher current account surpluses, while if Germany had 
been at the helm, France would have undergone wider changes: less inflation,
1 Compare Erkel-Rousse and Melitz (1995), who get the same result.
2 These correlations, it should be noted as well, link up the decompositions of Cohen-Wyplosz 
and Weber, concerning the macroeconomic variables themselves, with those of Bayoumi and 




























































































greater current account deficits and higher output.^ Given the relative 
magnitudes of these changes, it can be inferred that while Germany would have 
disliked the French policy choices, France would even have preferred the 
German ones. Such conclusions depend mostly on conventional views about 
social preferences in both countries. Thus, from the standpoint of the quality of 
policy decisions (based on national tastes), we conclude that France has nothing 
to fear from monetary union with Germany while the opposite is not evident. On 
these grounds, a Franco-German monetary' union might require political 
compensations to Germany by France, as is often asserted. Finally, our results 
indicate that the pursuit of a joint monetary policy would have promoted 
monetary integration — or at least would have done so in the event of German 
dominance over policy.
The conclusion briefly summarizes some of the main points.
2. A Simple Open Economy Model
At the core of the simple macro model in this paper is an open economy version 
of IS-LM augmented by a Phillips curve. Two equilibrium conditions mainly 
characterize the model: one for the aggregate domestic goods market (yj = y?). 
and another for external equilibrium (x, =0). The first depends on price 
adjustment, the second on adjustment in the real exchange rate. The dynamics of 
the model are governed by the slow adjustment of prices and real exchange rates 
over time and they embody certain long-run neutrality restrictions. Furthermore, 
movements in the main macro variables stem predominantly from the 
propagation of six types of exogenous disturbances: shocks to domestic 
aggregate supply (rjf), domestic demand (qj), relative demand for home goods 
or net exports ( q f ), domestic and foreign monetary policy (q"’and q"‘‘), and 
relative velocity of money at home and abroad (q,v*). The shocks q,m’ originate 
abroad and the other two open-economy shocks, q f and q**, may also but need 
not do so.
Our simple textbook model can best be illustrated by the following set of 
equations, where all variables except interest rates are measured in logarithms:
3 Of course, all of these results suppose that a change in monetary policy would have left the 
response parameters the same. They are therefore subject to the Lucas Critique. In common 
with many others we must assume that any changes in parameters stemming from a shift in 





























































































(Phillips curve) Ap, =71,.+ 5 ty ,-q j) (1)
(Aggregate output, IS) y, =a„ — oc, (i, -  Ap;j, ) + a,p, (e, +p' -  p, )
+a,qf‘ + ti; (2)
(Current account) x, = [Me, +PÌ -p, t + hf (3)
(Real effective exchange rate) e, +p^ -p , =(e,., +p[., -p„, )-y,x, + q)' (4)
(Interest rate and monetary policy) i, =£„ +£,y, +£: (p, -ti") (5)
(Monetary policy differences) i ,- ij = £„ +£,y, + £ ,(p ,-ti") +q”‘ (6)
Equation (1) is an open-economy Phillips curve with a sluggish 
adjustment of output prices (Ap,) to excess demand (y ,-q ;). Equation (2) 
defines domestic output (y,) as a sum of aggregate demand for domestic goods 
and supply shocks (y, = y? +q|).4 Thus, like Gall, we assume that supply as well 
as demand shocks affect current output. Aggregate demand for domestic output 
is decreasing in the domestic real interest rate (i, -Apjt, ), increasing in the real 
exchange rate (e, + pj — p,), and subject to domestic demand Cn )̂ and relative 
demand (rtf’) shocks. We measure the current account (x,) as the ratio of net 
exports (or exports minus imports of goods and services) to nominal gross 
domestic product. The distinction between the domestic demand shocks rf1 and 
the relative foreign demand shocks q)’ follows accordingly. That is, the former 
shocks affect aggregate demand while leaving x, unchanged, whereas the latter 
ones affect aggregate demand via x,- Imbalances in the current account drive the 
real exchange rate (e, + p '-p ,)  in the long-run. However, short-run deviations 
from current account balance — and therefore misalignment — can come about 
because of shocks to the excess demand for foreign money relative to domestic 
money, which we denote as relative velocity shocks (r f) .
The money shocks q" in equation (5) reflect influences of domestic 
monetary policy on the interest rate. The y, and p, terms in the equation, in turn, 
concern the impact of the demand for money. Effectively, therefore, the 
monetary authorities do not offset the other forces impinging on the interest rate 
— or at least do not do so perfectly. The next equation, (6), introduces a bilateral 
relation with the second country considered as a potential participant in a
4 a o in equation (3) should appropriately be defined so that in the steady state, y = q s. 




























































































monetary union. The term for the foreign money supply shock n"' reflects that 
part of the differential between monetary policy at home and in the other country 
which is attributable entirely to the foreigner's interest rate policy. It should be 
carefully noted that i| and t|"‘ in equation (6) are quite different from the other 
open-economy variables (xt, e ,+ p '-p ,,  q f  and n '’) in that they refer to a 
specific foreign country (France or Germany, as the case may be) and not to a 
relationship between the domestic country and the rest of the world. The 
equation obviously agrees with open interest rate parity given appropriate 
expectations.
The stylized predictions of this simple textbook model for the small open 
economy can be summarized as follows:
(a) Domestic and relative demand shocks have short-run effects (which 
may disappear in the long-run) on GDP and other real variables, such as the 
current account, real interest rates and real exchange rates as a result of sluggish 
adjustment of prices;
(b) Domestic monetary shocks are transmitted to the real sector only 
through changes in real interest rates;
(c) Relative velocity shocks are transmitted to the real sector only through 
changes in real (effective) exchange rates;
(d) Real GDP moves in the same direction as prices in response to 
domestic and relative demand, domestic and foreign money supply, and relative 
velocity shocks, but the two move in opposite directions in response to 
aggregate supply shocks.
3. The Structural VAR Model
3.1 General Approach
Since we adopt an extended version of Galfs (1992) structural VAR approach in 
identifying our open economy version of an IS-LM model for France and 
Germany, let us also follow his exposition of the structural VAR methodology. 
This methodology assumes that x=[xi,x2,x3,...,x]c] is a covariance stationary 
vector process, where x refers to a matrix of sets of observations. Each of the k 
elements in x has zero mean, or rather, has been differenced, demeaned or 
detrended prior to the estimation. Every element in x can also be expressed as a 




























































































Formally, x has a moving average representation:
x=C(L)e. (7)
The reduced form Wold moving average representation is given by:
x=E(L)v. (8)
where E(L)=[Ejj(L)], E(0)=I, and E(L) is invertible. After inversion of E(L). the 
reduced form autoregressive representation in terms of the innovations v 
becomes:
B(L)x=v. (9)
with B(L)=[Bjj(L)], B(L)=E(L)‘ ,̂ and B(0)=1, while the autoregressive 
representation in terms of the structural shocks £ follows as:
A(L)x=e, (10)
with A(L)=[Ajj(L)]. The reduced form innovations v are assumed to be a linear 
combination of the structural disturbances e
v=Se, (11)
with and A(0)=S'^. Given equations (7) and (8), this implies
C(L)=E(L)S, (12)
Since OLS estimation of equation (9) yields estimates of B(L) and hence 
estimates of its inverse, E(L)=B(L) , the matrix C(L) can be uniquely identified 
once enough restrictions are introduced to just-identify the matrix S.
How can such restrictions be obtained? As a start, it is convenient to 
assume that the structural shocks E are mutually orthogonal. Together with a 
helpful normalization condition,5 this assumption implies that E(ee')=I. Using 
this normalizing condition along with equation (11) yields:
SS=£2, (13)
5 The relevant normalization ensures that the vector of shocks e is measured in terms of one 




























































































After having found the OLS estimate of the variance-covariance matrix £1 of the 
reduced-form errors v, this last factorization imposes k*(k + I)/2 non-linear 
restrictions on the elements in S (that is. 21 resrictions for k=6). There then 
remains the issue of choosing restrictions for the other k*(k — l>/2 elements of 
S, to which we shall return following the discussion of our VAR specification.
3.2 Specification
In order to specify a structural VAR model conforming to our theoretical macro 
model, we began by performing the appropriate unit root and cointegration tests 
on the series for ŷ , pt, it, it-Apt, i f f ,  Xt- ar>d et+p[-Pt- These tests are 
documented in detail in the appendix of the paper. Wherever these tests did not 
provide clear-cut results, we stuck as closely as possible to Galfs choices in 
order to ease comparison. We also decided to estimate an identical model for 
both countries. Thus, we had to compromise on the specification in those cases 
where the time series properties of the data differed between Germany and 
France. This turned out to be a problem only with regard to inflation. Like Gali, 
we faced a choice between treating inflation as 1(0) or 1(1). The evidence points 
strongly to 1(0) in the case of Germany, based on the Phillips-Perron test. Thus, 
we treated inflation as an 1(0) process in both countries, in keeping with Gall', 
even though the issue is somewhat ambiguous for France.6 For this reason we 
will report on our main policy conclusions for France based on the 1(1) inflation 
specification. Thereby we will demonstrate the robustness of our results.
We formulated our structural VAR model for the covariance stationary 
vector process x=[Ayt, ifApt, Apt, A(if f ), Axt, A(e, + p‘ -  p,)], where Ayt is the 
first difference in the logarithm of GDP, it is the level of the nominal 3-month 
interest rate, Apt is the first difference in the logarithm of consumer prices (and 
therefore it-Apt is the real interest rate), ifi* is the 3-month interest rate 
differential, Axt is the first difference of the current account balance to GDP 
ratio, and A(et+p'-pt) is the first difference in the real effective exchange rate 
(REER) based on normalized relative unit labor costs7
6 As a result, we rewrote equation (1) accordingly with a constant instead of a lagged-inflation 
term on the right.
7 All o f our data are taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics, various issues, 





























































































Applying the structural VAR approach meant supposing that the vector 
process x is driven by a vector of six structural disturbances 
E=[e;,e",ef ,£]■’], consisting of aggregate supply shocks (ej), domestic and
relative demand shocks (ef and e?'), domestic and foreign monetary policy 
shocks (e™ and e™‘) and relative velocity shocks (e*‘). The vector of structural 
shocks e is then the empirical counterpart to the vector of structural disturbances 
T| in our open economy macro model.
3.3. Identifying Restrictions
To achieve identification of the structural shocks E=[E|,E|",ef,e"',Ef ,e'*] on the 
basis of the estimates of B(L) and the reduced form residuals v and their 
variance-covariance matrix LI, the matrix S has to be determined by a non-linear 
optimization procedure. Just-identification requires the imposition of 36 
identifying restrictions. We made the following choices:
(a) 21 non-linear restrictions on the elements in S come from the usual 
orthogonality condition SS'=Q (as mentioned before);
(b) 5 additional restrictions result from the identification of aggregate supply 
shocks in the tradition of Blanchard and Quah (1989), or by imposing long-run 
output neutrality of the other five shocks:
E) i(l)S i2+E]2(l)S22+E l3(| >s32+E14(1)S42+E|5(l)S52+Ei6(l)S62=0,
E 11 (1 )S 13+E12( 1 )S23+E i 3< 1 )S33+E 14( 1 )S43+E 15(1 )S53+E | &( 1 )S(,3=0,
E 11 (1 )S 14+E12( 1 )S24+E ] 3< 1JS34+E14( 1 )S44+E ] 5( 1 )S54+E ] g( 1 )S64=0,
E 11 (1 )S ] 5+E 12( 1 )S25+E 13( 1 )S35+E ] 4( 1 )S45+E 15( 1 )S55+E ] 6( 1 )S65=0,
E 11 (1 )S 16+E12( 1 )S26+E 13(1 )S36+E 14 (1 )S46+E 15<1 )S56+E 16( I )S66=°:
(c) domestic demand, relative demand, domestic and foreign money supply 
shocks are assumed to have no long-run effects on the current account (4 
restrictions)
E5 1 (1 )s 1 2+e 52< 1 >s22+e 53( 1 )S32+E54<1 >S42+E55(1 >S52+E56(1 )s62=°- 
e 5 1 (1 )S 1 3+e 52( 1 )s23+e 53< 1 )S33+E54<1 >S43+E55<1 )S53+E56<1 )s63=°- 
e 5 l( 1)S )4+e 52< 1 )S24+e 53< I )S34+E54< 1 )S44+E55( 1 )S54+E5g( 1 )S64=0, 




























































































(d) relative velocity shocks, in mm, have no long-run effects on the real 
effective exchange rate (1 restriction)
E61 ( 1 )S i 6+e 62( 1 's 26+e 63( 11S36+E64<1 )S46+E65(11S56+E66<1 's 66=0;
(e) foreign money supply shocks bear no long-run effects on the real interest 
rate (1 restriction)
E21 ( US i 4+e 22( 1 )S24+e 23( 1 )S34+E24< 1 )S44+E25< 1 )S54+E26<1 ls64=°;
(f) finally, domestic and foreign money supply shocks have no instantaneous 
effects on output and the current account (4 restrictions)
Si2=0, S]4=0, S52=0, 854=0.
These 36 restrictions uniquely determine the matrix S, as is essential in order to 
decompose the estimated VAR residuals into their orthogonal structural shock 
components. It may be readily seen that our theoretical restrictions represent a 
combination of long-run neutrality conditions (extended so as to cover the real 
exchange rate and the current account) and the hypothesis of the absence of 
short-run monetary effects on real performance.
4. Empirical Results for Germany and France 
4.1 The data
In the econometric work, we limited ourselves to seasonally adjusted quarterly 
data beginning in 1975.3 and ending in 1990.4. Our starting date stems from the 
lack of ready availability of earlier series for the real effective exchange rate, 
while our closing date results from the decision (for the time being) not to extend 
the work after German unification. Because of our use of four one-quarter lags in 
estimating the VARs, the estimates cover only the years 1977 through 1990, or 
56 observations.
Before reporting our estimates, a brief glance at the data is in order. Figure 
1 presents the time paths of the key macroeconomic variables under study in 
Germany and France. The top two panels of the figure show that output moved 
quite similarly in Germany and France except in the years 1981-’85 and following 
German unification in 1990. For much of the EMS period, a fairly close 




























































































rates converged considerably from 1979 up to 1991. at which time the 
convergence became almost complete. Nominal interest rates and inflation rates 
in both countries also moved closely together, thereby implying similar 
comovement in real interest rates. It follows that nominal and real interest rates 
are not likely candidates for explaining much of the discrepancies in the 
movements of output growth between the countries. Real effective exchange rates 
and current account balances would be far better choices, since these two 
variables behaved quite differently in the two countries. French and German real 
effective exchange rates moved largely in opposite directions after 1981. 
Correspondingly, German and French current account balances also started 
moving in totally distinct ways at that point. We thus regard real effective 
exchange rates and current accounts as potentially vital in explaining the 
differences in real performance between the two countries.
4.2 Impulse Responses
Figure 2 displays the impulse responses of output, inflation, the current account, 
and nominal interest rates differentials to various one-standard deviation shocks 
for Germany and France. Both in qualitative and quantitative terms, these results 
closely resemble those of Gall' (1992) for the United States. With regards to 
Germany and France, the contemporary impact of a positive supply shock is a 
0.25 percentage-point increase of GDP. The GDP response in Germany reaches a 
peak of 0.75 percentage points about 12 quarters after the shock and then retreats 
to a lower level, while in France the supply-shock response simply builds up 
continuously but stays below the German values. The supply shocks are also 
deflationary in both countries. In the case of all of the other five shocks, we find 
positive medium-run effects of varying profiles on output and inflation in both 
countries. It is of interest that in addition to supply shocks only aggregate demand 
shocks and relative demand shocks turn out to have a significant short-run to 
medium-run output-effects in Germany, while apart from supply shocks relative 
velocity shocks are those which matter primarily in France.8
Two additional differences between France and Germany should be singled 
out. First, domestic and foreign money supply shocks yield significant short-run 
to medium-run effects on the current account in France but not in Germany. 
Second, money supply shocks exert no significant impact on inflation at any 
frequency in Germany, whereas in France these shocks bear significant medium-
8 Standard error bands for the impulse response functions were derived by means of a Monte 
Carlo simulation based on normal random drawings from the distribution of the reduced-form 




























































































run inflation effects. Finally, note that foreign monetary shocks have rather weak 
effects in both countries.9
Figure 2 displays both the mean impulse responses and the correlations 
between the German and French impulse response to the each type of shock. 
Output and inflation respond in a very similar fashion to supply, demand and 
relative demand shocks, as witnessed by the high correlations, and output and 
inflation also respond in a highly synchronised manner to these shocks. But the 
response to domestic and foreign money suppy shocks differ widely between the 
two countries. Most importantly, domestic monetary shocks have a vastly greater 
medium-run impact on output and inflation inb France than Germany. As a result, 
it is possible that a change in monetary policy would have only a small impact in 
Germany but a large one in France.
4.3 Historical Decompositions into Shock Components
Figure 3 displays the decomposition of output, inflation and the current account 
into various orthogonal shock components during the study period We do not 
report similar decompositions for the other endogenous variables because the rest 
do not play a role in our policy analysis. The graphs highlight the importance of 
supply shocks in driving output. After the second round of oil price shocks, 
supply disturbances significantly reduced growth in Germany, though less so in 
France. These shocks also reduced inflation more in France than Germany after 
1987. Another finding of Figure 3 is the fairly similar pattern of influence of 
several of the shocks — the domestic demand, foreign money supply and relative 
velocity shocks — on output, inflation and the current account in both countries. 
Thus, the marked difference in current account developments in the two countries 
that we saw earlier cannot be explained by these shocks. Money supply, relative 
demand and relative velocity shocks are the ones which contribute most to the 
differences in current account performance.
But the most important aspect of Figure 3 concerns the contributions of 
money supply shocks. Owing to steady and predictable monetary policy (as 
witnessed by small e” values), money supply shocks explain virtually none of the 
history of output, inflation and the current account in Germany, whereas in France 
these shocks contribute heavily to the evolution of all three macroeconomic
9 Both in France and Germany none of the six shocks has any long run effects on the real 
interest rate, which implies offsetting changes in nominal interest rates and inflation. Weber 
(1995) also found that French and German data were consistent with the long ran validity of 
the Fisher effect of inflation on interest rates. But in the present paper the Fisher effect arises 




























































































variables throughout the sample. Once again, we see the greater potential for the 
impact of a change in monetary policy in France than Germany over the test 
period.
4.4 Variance Decomposition
Table 1 displays the variance decompositions of output, inflation and the current 
account into their shock components over selected horizons, going from one to 
forty quarters. The results conform to our earlier discussion. In Germany, supply 
shocks account for virtually all the variability of output in the long-run; but at 
business cycle frequencies (say, below ten quarters) domestic demand and 
relative velocity shocks play the dominant role in output fluctuations. In the 
French case, where things are otherwise substantially the same, demand and 
relative velocity shocks dominate supply shocks over a much longer time horizon.
These results deviate from those of either Blanchard and Quah (1989) or 
Galt (1992) for the United States. Blanchard and Quah attribute virtually all 
short-term output variability (98% at a four-quarter horizon) to demand shocks, 
while Gall finds that supply shocks dominate over all horizons. In our study, 
however, relative velocity shocks and domestic demand shocks play a major role 
in explaining output variability in both countries over considerable time horizons - 
- even as compared with supply shocks. This last finding, of course, strongly 
supports our prior beliefs about the importance of open economy variables in 
explaining business cycle fluctuations in Europe. In addition, the variability of 
inflation in Germany and France owes as much, if not more, to relative velocity 
shocks as it does to supply shocks, especially over the short horizon. Finally, 
relative demand and relative velocity shocks carry a lot of weight in the evolution 
of the current account in both countries.
4.5 Cross-Country Associations
In the light of the literature on monetary union, the asymmetry in the business 
cycle history of the two countries demands particular consideration. Table 2 
shows what happens if we measure this asymmetry based on Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen's criterion, which concerns the correlations between the stmctural 
shocks hitting the two economies. As can be seen, most of the numbers in the 
relevant 6x6 matrix of correlations are relatively moderate. The largest absolute 
one along the diagonal, 0.32, concerns the association between French and 
German supply shocks. With regard to the off-diagonal terms, the largest are 
around 0.4. It is also important to point out the 0.36 correlation between money- 
supply shocks in France and the foreign money supply shocks originating in 




























































































asymmetry between Germany and France. However, this impression is highly 
conditioned by Bayoumi and Eichengreen's chosen criterion. Once we identify as 
many as six different shocks rather than only two. while imposing a zero 
covariance between the shocks within each country (by construction), then low 
contemporaneous correlations between the countries become highly probable. 
Erkel-Rousse and Melitz (1995) obtain the same result in a similar identification 
of five structural shocks in six different countries. Yet the evidence of Figures 1 
speaks clearly of important common features in the French and Gemian 
experiences.
One way to show some of the associations between the German and 
French histories in our study is to look at the correlations between the separate 
shock-driven components of the key macroeconomic variables — output, inflation 
and current account — in both countries. These results are shown in Table 3. Now 
we find substantially larger numbers than the ones regarding the correlations 
between the shocks themselves. For example, the two relative demand shocks 
bear highly correlated effects on all three variables — positive ones in the case of 
the two outputs and inflations and negative ones in the case of the two current 
accounts. Relative velocity shocks apparently cause output and the current 
account to move sharply in opposite directions in Germany and France. Finally, 
the supply-shock-driven components of German and French output appear to be 
highly positively correlated, having a coefficient of 0.60 (as opposed to one of 
only 0.32 for the correlation between the shocks themselves). This higher 
similarity of movements of the supply shock components of output is the direct 
consequence of the very similar impulse responses of French and German output 
to supply shocks. These were shown above to have a correlation coefficient of 
0.98. Thus, the prominent associations between the macroeconomic performances 
of the two countries, which get lost when we only look at the cross-country 
correlations between the structural shocks, come back clearly into view once we 
add the shock responses of the two economies and look at the decompositions of 
macroeconomic variables into their shock components.
5. A Common Monetary Policy
Like others before us, we are essentially interested in comparing shocks and 
responses to shocks between countries in order to draw implications about the 
costs or benefits of monetary union. But for reasons given earlier, we propose 
doing so by focusing on the impact of a common monetary policy. One feature of 
a monetary union is a common monetary policy, and the experience of such a 
policy in countries with separate monies, we hope, will carry lessons about the 




























































































A uniform monetary policy will eliminate the shock e|”'. relating to 
differences in monetary policy that are attributable to the opposite country. With 
a common monetary policy, the e” shocks in both countries also become the 
same. Of course, with a common policy, not only these shocks, but also the 
predictable element of monetary policy would become identical as well in both 
countries. However, we cannot handle this aspect. As mentioned before (see note 
3), in an SVAR analysis we must assume the parametric structure to stay the 
same. Therefore, the focus necessarily turns on the impact of monetary surprises 
within the context of a set parametric structure. We will investigate three cases of 
common monetary policies in this very important, if limited, sense: (1) German 
dominance; (2) French dominance; and (3) equal influence over monetary policy 
by both countries. For exact definitions, let the monetary shocks in our earlier 
estimates (the baseline) be e "GER and eeFR, and the common monetary shocks in 
the simulations be e |\ The three policies under investigation will then be: (1) 
e: = e:0ER; (2) e™=eeFR; and (3) E^=(e,mm +e"GER) / 2. In example (1), German 
dominance, the only change in Germany is e |"'= 0 and the focus naturally turns on 
France; and in example (2), French dominance, attention similarly centers on 
Germany.
Figure 4 indicates that German dominance over French monetary policy 
(eT =£!"ger) would have raised the level of French output in the post-1980 period, 
mostly by preventing the sharp 1980/81 recession. German dominance would 
have also avoided much of the French inflation in 1977-83, while causing 
inflation to be higher in the later part of the study period. Overall. German 
dominance would have substantially reduced the variability of both output growth 
and inflation in France. Under German dominance, however, France would have 
experienced higher (but less variable) deficits in the current account. These 
important effects of German dominance on French macroeconomic performance 
must be understood as the combined effect of two forces: first, the much smaller 
size of the German money supply shocks than the French ones; second, the 
significant contribution of French money supply shocks to output, inflation and 
the current account at home. The elimination of the e"' shocks does not influence 
the results much, except possibly in connection with the interest rate differentials 
(i-i*) as such.
Some welfare implications may be drawn if we make some assumptions 
about French policy preferences. Table 4 shows the magnitudes of the changes in 
the principal macroeconomic variables in the country. As the table indicates, only 
a marked French emphasis on current account balance relative to both output and 
inflation could lead the country not to prefer the results with German dominance. 




























































































evidence of strong French concern with output, the switch to the policy of the 
"franc fort" in 1985-86 belies any possible idea that inflation matters little in 
French eyes.
This may raise a separate question: how do we explain the benefits to 
France from a different country's policy choices? The possibility to which we 
accord most credence is adherence to a false model in France. Our interpretation 
of the results is that the monetary ease of the seventies (which had been merely 
attenuated under Barre in 1976-81 but reinforced in the early Mitterrand years 
1981-83) was simply a policy mistake. The country would have been better off if 
the shift to a German-type policy of a "franc fort" had come about earlier.
The corresponding analysis of French dominance over German monetary 
policy is displayed in Figure 5. Given such dominance, Germany would have 
experienced a virtually unaltered output and inflation history and some increase in 
current account surpluses. Once again, Table 4 displays the relevant magnitudes. 
The mildness of the changes, despite the much larger monetary shocks in 
Germany, clearly stems from the aforementioned moderation of the influence of 
money supply shocks in this country. But moderate as they may be. it could be 
argued that the effects of French dominance would nevertheless have been 
unfavorable in German eyes. The reason essentially lies in the added current 
account surpluses. Admittedly, Germany's record of large current account 
surpluses during much of the study period created no obvious dissatisfaction, 
while the few incidents of current account deficits aroused concern. Yet, given 
the high German current account surpluses during the period, the substantial 
additions to these surpluses that we find under French dominance could hardly be 
viewed as an advantage. On these grounds, we lean towards the view of some 
German losses in case of French monetary control. But we agree that our results 
imply relatively small welfare effects in Germany.
Table 4 also summarizes the evidence in the probably more realistic case of 
a joint monetary policy. With equal French and German influence on policy, the 
results for Germany are basically unaltered. Interestingly, for France the outcome 
of a joint monetary policy seems no worse, if not slightly better, than with 
Germany acting alone. There is somewhat less output growth, but also less 
inflation. Thus, in case of a French preoccupation with inflation, France would 
also find joint policy superior to German dominance. 10 The most important
10 The surprising presence of lower French inflation if France has as big a part in decision­




























































































general conclusion with regard to France, however, is that German participation 
in decision-making always improves matters. We can show that this result still 
holds if we estimate our model with French inflation following an 1(1) instead of 
an 1(0) process.! 1
The issue of monetary integration requires us to turn our attention to the 
interest rate differentials i -  i * in Figures 4 and 5. Any tendency of a uniform 
monetary policy to promote monetary integration would show up in our study in a 
narrowing of the level or the variance of the nominal interest rate differentials or 
both. Analyzing the results in this light, we find a narrowing of the variance of 
these differentials in all instances of a common monetary policy, regardless of the 
mix of French and German influence. Historically, the interest rate differential 
displayed a standard deviation of 1.6 percent per year. This variability is reduced 
by 40 percent under German dominance, but only by 17 percent under French 
dominance. The scenario of German dominance therefore is conductive to greater 
monetary integration than the opposite case.
6. Conclusions
We began with the common idea that the welfare implications of a loss of 
monetary independence in a monetary union depend heavily on the news in the 
environment. However, we then deviated from many authors by observing that 
these implications cannot be inferred, or even vaguely approximated, from the 
dissimilarities between shocks and responses to shocks in different countries. 
Instead, we proposed examining the impact of a common monetary policy across 
the countries in our study, that is, France and Germany. Since these two nations 
are strongly interdependent through trade in all areas — commodities, services, 
capital goods and securities -  we adopted a structural VAR model incorporating 
the current account, the real exchange rate and interest rate differentials.
The outcomes of our simulations of a common monetary policy clearly do 
not relate to a full-blown monetary union. But they do pertain to one important 
aspect of such a union -  the one aspect, in our opinion, that the rest of the 
literature also tries to cope with in any significant way in analyzing shocks and
French monetary policy was less inflationary than the German one -  at least, within the 
domestic context — toward the end of the eighties (see Figure 4).
11 As regards Table 4, the revised numbers are 0.16, -0.18 and -0.89 instead of 0.22, -0.20 and 
-1.10 (German dominance) and 0.13, -0.68 and -0.93 instead of 0.17, -0.82 and -1.03 (joint 




























































































responses to shocks. Furthermore, we find that common monetar)' policies do 
tend to promote monetary integration by bringing interest rates closer together.
Our most important conclusion implies that France would not suffer but 
would even gain from German participation in monetary-policy-making, while 
Germany would lose from similar French participation in the decision process. An 
even fifty-fifty split in monetary influence rather than full dominance on one side 
or the other does not greatly affect the general outlook.
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Major Macroeconomic Indicators in Germany and France, 
Quarterly Data, 1977.1-1990.IV
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Figure 4: Actual and Counterfactual Economic Variables under 
German Dominance in Monetary Policymaking,
French Quarterly Data, 1977.I-1990.IV
Key to symbols: _____________ Actual, ---------------------- Simulation

































































































Figure 5: Actual and Counterfactual Economic Variables under 
French Dominance in Monetary Policymaking,
German Quarterly Data, 1977.I-1990.IV
Key to symbols:________________ Actual, .............................Simulation





























































































Variance Decomposition of Output, Inflation and the Current 
Account at Various Time Horizons, Quarterly Data 





















zon GER FRA G ER |FR A GER FRA GER FRA GER FRA GER FRA
Output
1 36.8 15.9 0.0 0.0 55.5 26.4 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.8 2.9 56.9
2 38.5 19.2 0.7 0.0 43.2 18.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 2.1 15.0 60.7
3 34.2 22.2 0.7 0.1 38.4 17.8 0.0 0.0 8.5 1.3 18.3 58.6
4 33.4 25.6 0.7 0.1 32.5 17.6 0.1 0.0 10.1 1.0 23.2 55.7
5 39.8 27.1 1.2 1.7 27.0 19.4 0.1 0.0 10.5 1.0 21.4 50.8
10 72.2 34.7 0.5 13.5 9.5 22.4 0.1 0.0 7.1 0.6 10.7 28.7
20 90.7 51.0 0.2 23.1 3.0 11.9 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.3 3.7 13.7
30 93.7 66.3 0.1 17.0 2.0 7.5 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.2 2.6 9.0
40 95.3 75.0 0.1 12.6 1.5 5.6 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.1 1.9 6.7
Inflation
1 17.7 8.9 0.0 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7 9.2 0.2 73.0 89.0
2 20.6 9.2 1.2 1.0 2.4 0.8 0.1 0.6 13.7 2.1 62.1 86.3
3 25.6 12.2 1.5 0.9 2.5 1.3 0.1 0.5 13.3 3.3 56.9 81.7
4 39.2 16.0 1.3 1.2 2.4 1.6 0.2 0.5 11.4 3.2 45.5 77.6
5 38.2 20.0 1.6 1.3 3.1 1.4 0.2 0.5 12.6 3.1 44.4 73.7
10 40.5 24.3 1.7 2.8 5.0 6.5 0.2 0.4 16.2 2.5 36.4 63.5
20 39.7 23.4 1.6 14.9 5.4 10.5 0.2 0.3 17.7 1.9 35.4 49.0
30 39.5 21.1 1.6 21.9 5.4 10.1 0.2 0.2 17.5 1.8 35.7 45.0
40 39.6 20.9 1.6 22.5 5.4 10.0 0.2 0.2 17.5 1.7 35.7 44.6
Current Account / GDP Ratio
1 48.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 12.8 0.0 0.0 8.2 24.5 42.6 62.4
2 40.1 0.7 0.0 0.5 1.2 10.3 0.0 0.1 20.0 22.8 38.6 65.6
3 37.7 0.9 0.3 2.7 1.3 8.5 0.0 0.2 29.1 22.7 31.5 64.9
4 33.6 0.9 0.6 5.1 1.4 6.1 0.0 0.2 34.7 21.0 29.6 66.7
5 28.6 1.0 0.6 6.7 1.2 5.2 0.0 0.3 41.4 20.8 28.0 65.9
10 17.5 1.2 0.5 10.5 0.9 5.6 0.0 0.2 54.9 28.1 26.1 54.3
20 11.5 1.4 0.4 12.8 0.7 10.6 0.0 0.2 70.6 37.7 16.9 37.3
30 8.3 5.7 0.3 17.0 0.5 8.4 0.0 0.1 78.8 41.5 12.0 27.3





























































































Cross-country Correlations of Structural Shocks 
























31.8 -21.4 1.8 -28.0 15.3 14.4
Money Supply 
Shock
23.7 -25.3 42.7 34.7 7.8 -3.5
Domestic Demand 
Shock
11.4 24.6 -13.4 35.9 13.4 28.3
Foreign Money 
Supply Shock
-19.1 -11.2 0.4 18.0 -15.8 -7.1
Relative Demand 
Shock
20.1 -0.4 -4.3 -39.2 -18.4 -8.8
Relative Velocity 
Shock





























































































Cross-country Correlations of Shock Components of Output, Inflation 

























59.8 62.3 51.7 -5.9 46.0 -0.9
Money Supply 
Shock
1.5 12.5 -23.2 -30.9 14.0 17.4
Domestic Demand 
Shock
30.2 20.2 -3.0 3.2 27.5 12.5
Foreign Money 
Supply Shock
-23.7 -30.5 54.3 6.7 -5.2 -36.8
Relative Demand 
Shock
43.7 80.8 2.4 -21.0 51.6 17.4
Relative Velocity 
Shock




36.4 44.4 13.9 7.1 12.9 25.3
Money Supply 
Shock
9.3 -4.4 -37.0 -11.9 -1.8 17.8
Domestic Demand 
Shock
-2.8 27.4 -0.5 6.7 24.0 0.6
Foreign Money 
Supply Shock 13.2
-12.6 -1.8 -11.1 1.7 -4.4
Relative Demand 
Shock 5.2
67.3 30.1 19.0 39.5 33.4
Relative Velocity 
Shock




-20.5 -14.8 34.6 30.1 16.6 18.3
Money Supply 
Shock -18.8
-24.3 23.0 17.0 17.0 29.3
Domestic Demand 
Shock
-16.0 22.5 -15.9 -24.0 1.7 1.0
Foreign Money 
Supply Shock 2.6
-5.2 -3.5 -10.1 -11.4 -25.9
Relative Demand 
Shock
44.6 38.0 29.1 29.1 -65.5 20.1
RelativeVelocity
[shock






























































































Changes in tbe Mean and Standard Deviation of Economic 
















0.22 (2.38) 0.17(2.38) 0.07 (2.60) 0.03 (2.60)
Inflation 
(avg. % p.a.)
-0.20 (7.34) -0.82 (7.34) 0.07(3.11) -0.08 (3.11)
Curr. Account / 
GDP (avg. %)
-1.10(0.03) -1.03 (0.03) 1.68 (3.50) 1.67(3.50)
Standard Deviations Standard Deviations
Output Growth 
(avg. % p.a.)
-0.46 (2.70) -0.44 (2.70) -0.11 (4.23) -0.20 (4.23)
Inflation 
(avg. % p.a.)
-1.76 (3.92) -1.61 (3.92) -0.07 (2.16) -0.12 (2.16)
Curr. Account / 
GDP (avg. %)
-0.33 (0.95) -0.36 (0.95) 0.04(2.31) 0.04(2.31)
Key: The numbers in the table indicate the change of the means and standard deviations 
under the various policy scenarios relative to their historical values. The numbers in 






























































































A l. Unit Root Properties of the Data
Our testing strategy critically depends on the relative order of integration of the data. 
This appendix will thus discuss the unit root properties of the data. Tables A1 and A2 display 
three types of unit root test statistics: (i) augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) ADF 't-statistics' for 
both demeaned (tu(z)) and detrended data (tT(z)); (ii) Stock's (1991) 95% confidence intervals 
for the largest unit root (p), along with the estimate of the actual root of the series (p ), and 
(iii) three Phillips-Perron 't-statistics' (Z(t4 Z(ta.), and Z (ts)). The main difference between the 
ADF and Phillips-Perron tests is that the ADF tT(z) and tu(z) tests adjust for autocorrelations 
in the first differences of the data parametrically by optionally including j  lags of the 
differenced data as regressors:
Azt = p + (a  -  l)zt_, + y , £  Az,_, +ut, 
1=1
tu(z) for Hq: a = l, (A l)
J
Azt = p + (a  -  l)zt_, + 3t + y , ]T  Az,_, + ut,
i= l
tx(z) forHo: a = l, (A2)
whilst the three Phillips-Perron tests:
Az, = (â -l)z ,_ , +û„ Z (t4) for H0: 5=1, (A3)
Azt = p* + (a* -  l)z,_, + u", Z (ta.)forHo: a *= l, (A4)
Az, = P  + ( 5 -  l)z,_, + P (t-T /2 )  + ut, Z (ts) forHo: 5=1, (A5)
are based on a nonparametric adjustment for this type of autocorrelation. The Phillips-Perron 
tests reported here are based on the Newey and West (1987) estimator, which yields a robust 
variance estimate in the presence of dependent and heterogeneously distributed data by 
prefiltering the residuals ut from the regression:
Azt = p  + P (t-T /2 )+u t, (A6)
(under the restrictions |i=0 and P=0 for (A3), and [3=0 for (A4)) with a triangular lag window 
with weights for lag i given by co(i, j) = l - [ i / ( j  + l)]. The choice of the relevant test




























































































Z(t(1.)» Z (ts), and Z(t~) concerning the significance of the deterministic drifts and trends in 
equations (A4) and (A5), respectively.
The specification of the degree of time differencing and drift or trend adjustment of the 
endogenous variables varies somewhat between Germany and France, as is documented in the 
last column of Tables A1 and A2. Since we focus on the long-run properties of the data, we 
chose the maximum sample period for which each time series was available in order to conduct 
our unit root analysis. Our results show that output ( y j  in both countries is integrated of order 
one with a drift, 1(1 )+d. Consumer price inflation (ApJ in Germany looks like an 1(0) process 
with a trend according to both the Phillips-Perron and the Stock test. These test statistics are, 
however, only marginally significant for the French inflation process. For France we find 
stronger evidence of an 1(1) inflation process. Gall (1992) was confronted with the same 
problem and chose inflation to be an 1(0) process. Since we decided to estimate an identical 
model specification for both countries, we have followed Gali in treating inflation as 1(0) in 
both countries, but for France we also report our main results with an 1(1) specification.
Similar problems arise for nominal short-term interest rates (ij. Nominal interest rates 
were found to be 1(1) for France, and l(0)+d for Germany. It is therefore not surprising that 
interest rate differentials (i,-i| ) were found to be 1(1). Furthermore, given the properties of the 
consumer price data, real interest rates (r^-ApJ turned out to be 1(0) with a trend for 
Germany. In order to check for possible cointegration in France we examined whether the 
linear combination of French inflation rates and nominal interest rates was 1(0). We found that 
French real interest rates are indeed best described by an 1(0) process. Finally, the current 
account to GDP ratios (x j and real effective exchange rates (e+Pj -P,) turned out to be 1(1) in 




























































































A2. Confidence Bands for the Impulse Response Functions
Although it is standard to report point estimates, a meaningful interpretation of the 
dynamic responses of the endogenous variables to the various shocks is impossible unless 
standard errors are attached to the point estimates There are two ways to compute standard 
errors for these statistics. One is the asymthotic criteria suggested by Lutkepohl (1991). The 
other is to construct standard errors numerically by using a Monte Carlo approach. Here we 
follow the second approach and compute the first and second moments of the statistics by 
drawing directly from the posterior distribution of the VAR coefficients
To outline our Monte Carlo integration approach, we follow Gall 1992) and Canova 
and Di Nicolo (1995). Our random drawings are conditioned on both the posterior distribution 
of the VAR coefficients and our estimate of the just-identified matrix S. Suppose we write the 
VAR as:
y, = ( I®  xt)P + e t (A7)
where ® is the Kronecker delta, x, is the vector of lagged yjt (i=l,2,...,m), P is a vector 
containing the stacked version of the A(L) and of the A,, matrices and ut is i.i.d. with 
distribution N(0,£). We denote the ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates of (3 and £ by b and 
Z. I f  we assume that the prior distribution of P is /(P ,£ ) cc|£p,n' 1)'2, the posterior distribution 
of P, conditional on £, is normal with mean b and covariance matrix £®(x'x)'' and the 
distribution of £_l is Wishart(TZ)',T), where T is the sample size. First and second moments of 
can be computed by drawing Q times from the above distribution for p and £, inverting the 
VAR, and conditional on the just-identified matrix S computing the average impulse responses 
and standard error bands by appropriately averaging over replications. In our simulations we 
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